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ABSTRACT
The Philippines National Irrigation Administration (NIA) has promoted 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) in National Irrigation Systems 
(NIS) since the 1980s. However, NIS performance has generally been 
poor. This paper aims to assess the factors in poor PIM performance 
through a case study in Bohol Province using the theories of Common-
Pool Resources proposed by Ostrom and Freeman. PIM design principles 
do not include the distributional share system which Freeman sets at 
the very heart of effective Water Users Associations. The Irrigation 
Service Fee (ISF) was set as a fixed rate per farm size and was not 
linked with the volume of irrigation water each farmer received. Since 
a head and tail distinction remained in the service queue, farmers in the 
tail portion were disadvantaged by paying relatively higher ISFs. Since 
the Irrigators’ Association (IA) could not remove non-payers and non-IA 
members because they could still take irrigation water, and there was no 
effective sanction against misuse of funds by IA Boards of Directors, IA 
management was unsuccessful even though there was sufficient water 
available. However, introducing the distributional share system in IA 
management was difficult due to institutional problems and technical 
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problems in the physical structure of the irrigation system.
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INTRODUCTION
　Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), implemented alongside 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) policies, has become a common 
principle of irrigation management. IMT is expected not only to reduce 
the government’s management costs but also to improve the management 
efficiency of irrigation systems, which can be attained by the intensive 
management undertaken by beneficiary farmers. The PIM approach 
has been promoted by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a 
government irrigation agency in the Philippines, since the mid-1970s for 
Communal Irrigation Systems (CIS). CIS systems, which irrigate an area 
below 1000 ha, are owned and managed by farmers. In the 1980s, the 
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NIA expanded the PIM approach to National Irrigation Systems (NIS), 
which are originally owned and managed by the government and cover, in 
principle, more than 1000 ha. 
　In the PIM approach, the NIA assigns an Institutional Development 
Officer (IDO) to the irrigated area to organize a Water Users Association 
(WUA), called an Irrigators Association (IA) in the Philippines, before the 
construction of any CIS and NIS. Ideally, the NIA and the IA should be 
equal partners: the IA participates in the planning, design, and construction 
of the irrigation system, and after construction, in managing the whole 
irrigation system for the CIS or in managing the irrigation system below 
the secondary canals for the NIS (Bagadion and Korten, 1991). The IA’s 
working arrangement with the NIA in the NIS is called the Joint System 
Management (JSM). The engagement of the IA—making it functional 
and instilling in the members a sense of ownership of their irrigation 
system—is designed to make IMT successful. To achieve this, the NIA 
has established by-laws stipulating the organizational structure of IAs, the 
rules and regulations to be followed, and the penalties and sanctions for 
offenses or violations of such rules (NIA Central Office, 2002). Despite these 
by-laws, however, the performance of the NIS has generally been poor 
(Maleza and Nishimura, 2007). 
　For the NIS, for instance, the coverage rate of the JSM in 2000 was less 
than 1% of the total irrigated area. Further, the average collection rate of 
the Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) from 1998 to 2000 was only 38%. Also, a 
survey by the NIA of 1674 IAs in the Philippines in February 1999 showed 
that 38 % of these associations were not functional (KRI International 
Corporation, Nippon Koei Co., Ltd., 2001). 
　Often, the lack of sufficient budget has been cited as the reason for these 
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nonfunctional IAs and for the slow progress of IMT. Adequate funds can 
rehabilitate irrigation facilities before their transfer and strengthen IAs 
(e.g., through the NIA’s assignment of competent IDOs, training of IA 
officials, and carrying out of organizational building activities). However, 
we can ask is the lack of budget the only cause of such problems? Are 
there institutional weaknesses in the design principles of PIM as practiced 
by NIA? This paper examines the factors affecting poor PIM performance 
through a case study in Bohol Province in the Philippines using the 
theories of Common-Pool Resources (CPR) management proposed by 
Ostrom (1990) and Freeman (1989, 1992). The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. First, the analytical framework and methodology of the study 
are presented. Next, the irrigation system is described and IA is illustrated. 
Then, the performance of the irrigation system is evaluated. The reasons 
for poor performance of the system are subsequently considered and 
conclusions are presented.
I.　ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
1)　Theories of CPR management
　Since the irrigation water and the irrigation system delivering the 
water to its beneficiary farmers are a kind of CPR, I applied Ostrom’s 
(1990) design principles of long-enduring CPR and Freeman’s (1989 /1992) 
distributional share system model to assess the performance of PIM. I 
present conceptual models drawn from the work of Ostrom and Freeman. 
These models have emerged from years of work analyzing the difference 
between successful long-enduring common property resource organizations 
and failed ones. Cases are drawn from around the world (Freeman, 2009).
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　Ostrom’s design principles are illustrated by case studies of long-
enduring common pool resource institutions such as the Philippines’ 
Zanjera traditional irrigation system, cattle grazing on the Swiss Alps, 
and groundwater management in coastal California. According to Ostrom, 
although there are differences among the CPR settings, long-enduring 
and self-governing CPR institutions share eight design principles. These 
principles are elements or conditions essential for the success of these 
institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance to the rules 
by generations of appropriators. If a CPR institution does not share these 
design principles, however, it cannot avoid free-riders, who break its rules 
and appropriate resources unfairly without fulfilling their obligations as a 
member of the institution. As a result, deterioration and dysfunction of the 
CPR institution ensues, finally leading to depletion and destruction of the 
resource itself. Table I lists these eight principles (Ostrom, 1990).１ 
１　For a detailed explanation on the eight design principles of long-enduring CPR 
institutions, see Ostrom 1990, pp. 88-102.
Table I. Ostrom’s Design Principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR 
institutions
1. Clearly defined boundaries
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resources units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and/or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules.
4. Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are 
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
────────────
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　Freeman’s conceptual model was drawn from his own case studies in 
the Western United States, Pakistan, and Nepal, and other case studies 
of successful irrigation systems around the world. Freeman (1989:24-35, 
1992:2-5) presents the following six essential characteristics of an effective 
local WUA that enable the association to provide efficient and equitable 
water control: 
1) Leaders of the local organization should not be cosmopolitan outsiders 
but irrigators representing the various reaches of the local canal 
system.
2) Leadership and staff of the local organization are responsible to local 
members.
3) Water delivery is dependent on the fulfillment of organizational 
obligations.
4) The water share system should remove head and tail distinctions in 
service queues. 
5. Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) 
by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by 
both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to 
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged 
by external governmental authorities.
8. (For CPRs that are parts of larger systems) Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Source: Ostrom 1990, p.90.
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5) Water resource control of members is high. 
6) Propensity of members to support local organization is high. 
　Furthermore, Freeman (2009) states, “It is important to distinguish 
between the first four attributes of [his] conceptual model from the last 
two. If the first four criteria for successful common property management 
are fulfilled, [he] asserts that water control will increase and that farmer 
propensity to support the organization by following rules and paying share 
assessments will increase. The last two are outcomes of the first four - 
they are driven by the first four”. 
　According to Freeman (1989), a functioning water share distributional 
system (third and fourth essential characteristics) is at the very heart 
of any effective WUA. “When water is controlled through a viable share 
system for productivity and justice,” WUAs become sustainable (Freeman, 
1992:4). Freeman (1992:2-4) also points out that, “The idea of a water share 
organizational agreement is two sided. [First,] a share confers upon each 
member of the irrigation community a legitimate access to water within 
the arranged rules and tools; [Second,] it confers an obligation to contribute 
an agreed upon ‘fair share’ of the costs of managing water in the system.” 
While water share arrangements may vary considerably from locale to 
locale, Freeman states three important considerations to make WUAs 
successful: “[First,] water volumes received [by each member are] roughly 
proportionate to shares of system costs paid [by each member]. This is 
essential to equity…[ Second], the water share system overcomes the 
problem of [distributing inequitable volumes of water to the] ‘head’ and ‘tail’ 
locations of irrigators… Head irrigators are uninterested in spending their 
money on behalf of those less well located. Head-tail problems can hobble 
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WUA’s. On the other hand, it is quite possible to organize the head-tail 
distinction out of the irrigation community and create a common interest of 
all - head and tail – in the performance of the canals. Irrigators do this by 
measuring water volume delivered to the field gate. If water is distributed 
by volume, or some rough approximation of it, and if a poorly performing 
canal delivers a given volume only over a longer period of time toward the 
tails, and if ‘head’ farmers cannot obtain their next delivery until the tails 
are served, they will feel the pinch of poorly performing canals and become 
interested in their improvement. Water lost downstream is also lost to 
[head farmers]. All irrigators then share a common interest in investing in 
the best possible canal management…[ Third], conflicts … are resolved by 
getting the share system to work on behalf of the farmers. Conflicts among 
irrigators can only be resolved in terms of rewarding those who support 
the share system, punishing those who violate it, or possibly reforming the 
share system so that it no longer generates grievances.” 
　Freeman’s  water  share  distributional  system  means  that  a  member’s 
‘Share of Cost’ for system management is proportionate to his/her 
‘Share of Water’ and ‘Share of Vote’ in the management of the WUA. If 
a member’s Share of Cost is bigger, his/her Share of Water and Share of 
Vote in the WUA will also be bigger (Freeman, 1992). For example, “if a 
farmer receives 15 % of the benefit (water in a timely way), the farmer 
must pay 15 % of the organizational cost of managing that water in the 
local command area, and the farmer will possess 15% of the voting shares 
in conduct of local organizational business” (Freeman, 2009). If a water 
share distributional system is introduced into WUA management, and if 
the equity (i.e., the equivalence of each WUA member’s Share of Cost and 
Share of Water) is made clearly known among the association’s members, 
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any non-payer or free-rider who breaks the equity among beneficiaries will 
be readily identified and sanctioned. Hence, each member will be inclined 
to comply with the rules and members will be able to resolve conflicts 
among themselves (Freeman 1992). 
　To manage an irrigation system sustainably over the long term, 
Freeman points out that a sense of fairness must be shared among the 
members. To do so, the obligations of each member must be equivalent to 
his/her benefit and must be known to all members. That is, the volume 
of water received by each member and the amount of organizational 
obligations (irrigation service fee payment, provision of labor, etc.) borne by 
each member must be clear to all. It is therefore necessary to measure the 
volume of water delivered to individuals’ farmland in order to introduce a 
distributional share system. In addition, the irrigation system must have 
irrigation facilities (canals, farm ditches) at the level of individual members’ 
farmland. On the other hand, if several members share common turnouts, 
and therefore do not know the exact volume of water used by each 
member, any members who feel their burden is bigger than their benefit 
will be dissatisfied, possibly leading to withdrawal from WUA. However, 
it is difficult for central government agencies or large donors to design 
detailed plans for irrigation facilities that cover every farm ditch and 
turnout at the individual farm level because of the insufficient manpower, 
budget, and construction periods. Such complicated work should therefore 
be done at the local level (Freeman 2008).
　This is the reason why Freeman states the importance of local leader 
and staff accountability to local members (the first and second essential 
characteristics). As an outsider, a staff member of the central government 
agency, even one with deep knowledge and technology of irrigation 
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engineering and highly motivated to do his/her job managing irrigation 
systems, cannot attain the specific local knowledge of individual irrigation 
systems indispensable for management of an effective distributional 
share system at the site. Furthermore, an outsider would not be able to 
create local social capital, which is necessary for resolving the conflicts 
and problems that incessantly occur in irrigation systems and among 
beneficiaries. Such conflicts and problems should be resolved by the local 
people themselves, and accordingly, Board of Directors (BOD) members 
and staff should be composed of local farmers (Freeman 1992).
　There are case studies of successful irrigation systems that have 
water share distributional systems and Freeman’s (1989, 1992) essential 
characteristics of effective WUAs (Freeman, 1992; Maass and Anderson, 
1978; Martin and Yoder, 1988; Siy, 1982). This paper assesses the 
performance of PIM and its impact on one irrigation system in Bohol 
province, Philippines, using Ostrom’s design principles and Freeman’s 
essential characteristics of effective WUAs. Among Ostrom’s eight design 
principles, the second principle (congruence between appropriation and 
provisional rules and local conditions) is considered equivalent to Freeman’s 
third essential characteristic (water delivery is dependent on the fulfillment 
of organizational obligation, that is, the water share distributional system). 
2)　Research methods
　The author uses the field data gathered from field surveys of various 
stakeholders involved in Irrigation System A (assumed name; abbreviated 
to AIS hereafter) in Bohol Province from 1999 to 2005. Each field survey 
lasted for two to three weeks. The survey was conducted using Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (RRA), especially Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI) and 
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participatory observation. The interviews asked about the respondents’ 
activities in the irrigators’ association, farm, and social settings, as well 
as about their social and family relations. The interviewees consisted of 
the members of the BOD and ordinary members of four IAs of the AIS, 
officials of the NIA, as well as the staff of the local government of the 
municipality and of five villages (barangays) where the AIS is located. 
　A total of 152 respondents were interviewed in February 1999 (n=45), 
March 2000 (n=24), February 2001 (n=22), August 2002 (n=20), August 2003 
(n=21), and August 2005 (n=20). 
II.　DESCRIPTION OF AIS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
　AIS spread to five barangays, Z, P, L, AA and K (assumed names), in 
Municipality V (assumed name). AIS is a rare example of an IMT which 
had introduced JSM between the NIA and the IA in managing the NIS. In 
1999, the NIA Provincial Irrigation Office (PIO) managed the dam and main 
canal while four IAs (IAB, IAC, IAD, IAE) managed the secondary canals. 
The irrigation system consists of a dam, main canal (cemented), lateral 
Table II.　Irrigation canals of Irrigation System A
Canal Type
Planned 
length (km)
Actual 
length (km)
Planned 
turnout
Actual 
Turnout
Main Concrete 3.12 1 6
LB Earth 1.68 3.2 3 33
LB1 Earth 0.76 12
LB2 Earth 2.16 22
LC Earth 3.6 7 29
LD Earth 3.78 7 26
LD1 Earth 0.66 1.9 2 21
LE Earth 2.13 3.14 3 12
Source: Arranged by Sugimoto, 2001.
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canals (earth) (LB1, LB2, LB, LC, LD, LE (assumed names)), tertiary canals, 
and farm ditches. 
　While the area planned for irrigation was 750 ha, only 530 ha were 
actually irrigated (Sugimoto, 2001). Also, in 2001, while there were only 
530 members of the IA, approximately 800 beneficiaries were recorded 
(Sugimoto 2001). In 1992, four IAs were organized by the IDO of the NIA 
using the PIM approach. Expected to manage the IA was the IA president 
and the BOD members elected by the IA members. That year, the JSM 
was also introduced in the irrigation system. In the JSM, the four IAs were 
required to manage water delivery under the lateral canals, to clean the 
lateral canals and below, to hold a general assembly, to hold BOD meetings, 
and to collect ISF from the members. The IA could use 15 % of the ISF 
to pay for the honorarium of the BOD and to conduct other activities of 
the association. The rate of ISF nationwide was fixed by the NIA Central 
Office as 175 kg of paddy per hectare or its cash equivalent.
　However, the performance of the four IAs was not satisfactory. 
With severe damage from El Nino in 1998, these were non-functional in 
February 1999. There was water shortage at the lower portion of the AIS, 
illegal checking of water, water conflicts, absence of canal cleaning, low 
attendance to the IA general assembly, failure to collect penalties, and low 
collection rate of ISF (only 36.3% in 1996) (Sugimoto, 2001). The collection 
rate was lower than the national average of 46 % from 1991 to 1997 for 
the entire NIS (KRI International Corporation, Nippon Koei Co., Ltd., 2001). 
Water allocation was also neither equal nor effective. Because of water 
leakages from the earth canal turnouts and illegal checking upstream, 
there was a water shortage downstream. On average, 15 % of water 
was lost at the lateral canals per 1 km (Sugimoto, 2001). Poor irrigation 
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facilities made water management and the equal delivery of water among 
beneficiary farmers difficult. 
　Because the dam and main canal were managed by the NIA’s PIO, 
the NIA’s gatekeeper opened and closed the turnouts to each lateral 
canal daily. When the actual water flow was compared with the share of 
irrigated areas, it was found that the upstream lateral canals (LB1, LB2, 
LB) received more than their allocated share of water, while the two 
downstream lateral canals (LC and LD) received less than their allocated 
share (Sugimoto, 2001). 
　The upstream IA (IAB) was privileged in water allocation and had 
little water shortage. Beneficiaries at the upstream portion of the lateral 
canal received more water. Thus, a head and tail distinction existed in the 
service queue.
　NIA’s daily water allocation was rather rigid based on the ‘usual 
procedure’ of fixing the depth of canal water during the cropping season 
and closing the turnouts when there was rain the day before. In each 
lateral canal, water was rotated to provide water upstream on Monday and 
Tuesday, middle stream on Wednesday and Thursday, and downstream 
Table III.　Size of irrigated area and water allocation ratio per IA
LB1 LB2 LB B all LC LD LE
Irrigated area 24.0 ha 41.9 ha 67.0 ha 132.9 ha 142.6 ha 184.4 ha 62.2 ha
Irrigated area ratio 4.1% 8.2% 14.0% 26.3% 24.6% 33.6% 11.1%
Actual water 
allocation ratio
7.6% 13.4% 24.5% 45.5% 15.5% 22.3% 16.0%
Planned allocation 
ratio
5% 10% 20% 35% 25% 25% 15%
Total does not total 100% as some areas were directly irrigated by the main canal.
Source: Arranged by Sugimoto, 2001.
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on Friday and Saturday. If there was water shortage, each IA president 
or BOD was expected to request additional water delivery from the IDO. 
However, the proactiveness of the officials in performing their expected 
responsibilities, as well as the relationship of the IA president and 
members, varied for each IA. Further, some farmers close to the IDO, 
such as big landowners, made direct requests for water to the IDO. This 
request-based water allocation resulted to unreliable or inequitable water 
distribution. Water distribution by the NIA was likewise unreliable and 
unstable. Since the ISF was not determined by volume of water but fixed 
by irrigated area, the upstream and ‘influential’ farmers were advantaged 
while the downstream members were disadvantaged. 
　Further, NIA had low control over water delivery. Because of dam 
capacity and canal leakage, only 530 ha were actually irrigated vis-à-vis the 
planned area of 750 ha in 1999. However, inside the planned area, cultivated 
land continued to increase because of land development. In response to 
the local requests, the NIA also planned on extending the length of lateral 
canals LC and LE to irrigate an additional 200 ha outside the planned area. 
Again, this move would potentially have led to a greater water shortage at 
the AIS. 
　There were other financial and organizational problems. The NIA PIO 
always experienced financial difficulty because of the low collection rate 
of ISF from the AIS and amortization from the CISs. Lacking funds, the 
PIO could not repair broken irrigation facilities or pay staff salary on 
time; it even had to dismiss IDOs or temporary employees. With only 
one IDO assigned at the AIS to deal with about 500 members in 1999, it 
was difficult to prevent and handle all the problems (e.g., conflicts among 
farmers, canal monitoring) reported by farmers. There were no liaison 
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meetings between the NIA and 4 IAs, and the IDO had to deal with these 
problems in a top-down manner, which in turn created discontent toward 
the NIA among farmers. The apparent communication gap between the 
NIA and IA was against the ideal of cooperation and equal partnership 
among stakeholders as laid out by the PIM. In addition, since the IDO 
maintained lists of its IA members and conducted general assemblies for 
the IAs and BODs, the beneficiary farmers became dependent on the IDO. 
This was also contrary to the ideal PIM wherein officials and members 
should feel a sense of ownership in managing the association. 
III.　DESCRIPTION OF IAB
　Among the four IAs, IAB (assumed name) is located furthest upstream 
of the AIS. As a result, it received more than its share of water. IAB 
consists of the irrigated areas of lateral canal LB1, LB2, LB (assumed 
names) and of the main canal. In February 1999, it was divided in three 
sections: B1, B2, and B (assumed names) from the upstream region. Section 
B1 covered the LB1 area, B2 covered the LB2 area, and B covered the LB 
and main canal areas (see Figure 1). The irrigated areas of IA B covered 
two barangays, Z and P (assumed names), where most of the beneficiaries 
were residents.２ Section B1 and B2 belonged to Barangay Z. However, 
the lower portion of LB in Section B was covered by Barangay Z, while 
the upstream portion of LB and the main canal area were covered by 
Barangay P. Moreover, with two political groups in Barangay Z, it can be 
said that there were three social subgroups in IAB. 
　Although the water delivered was sufficient, water distribution was 
２　The populations of Barangay Z and Barangay P in 1999 were 1257 and 1066, 
respectively. The number of households was 237 and 212, respectively.
────────────
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inequitable; that is, upstream of LB1 and LB2 received sufficient water, 
but there was a water shortage downstream of LB and the main canal, 
because of water loss and illegal checking at the LB canal. Most affected 
by this water shortage were members in Section B of Barangay P who 
receive water from the main canal through paddy-to-paddy irrigation 
because of a lack of farm ditches. Thus, while members in Section B1 and 
B2 were relatively cooperative in IA activities such as canal cleaning, those 
in Section B were not. 
　The performance of IAB was unsatisfactory like the other IAs. Not only 
was there a downstream water shortage, there was also illegal checking 
of water, water conflicts, a lack of canal cleaning, low attendance at IA 
general assembly meetings, failure to collect penalties, and a low ISF 
collection rate. Moreover, IA membership registration was insufficient. The 
IA president and BOD members continued to collect the ISF from farmers 
whom they knew to be beneficiaries, but did nothing about non-member 
beneficiaries who they knew to be using the water freely (free-riders). 
The financial records were also inadequate, and IAB failed to collect 
information on the exact amount of ISF paid by each member and how 
much fee collectors remitted to the IA. In addition, non-payers received no 
sanctions and could continue to take water freely. In the end, the IA did 
not have enough funds to conduct IA activities such as constructing an IA 
office, and purchasing IA equipment.
　To improve the poor performance of the IAs, strengthening activities 
were conducted through a technical cooperation project implemented by 
the Japanese government from July 1999 to November 2003 (hereinafter 
‘the Project’). The Project tried to deal with the issues of inadequate 
manpower and funds, while implementing the proper processes of PIM. 
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The design principles were not modified as the Project planned to faithfully 
follow the NIA’s PIM approach. The Project aimed to help the IA attain 
independence and negotiating power with outside agencies such as the 
NIA and local governments. Comparison of IAB’s situation in August 
2003 and February 1999 showed considerable improvements in financial 
management. A transparent financial recording system was established, 
and it became possible to identify ISF non-payment as well as misuse by 
collectors’ (i.e., the BOD). However, the ISF collection rate, which increased 
to  74.2%  in  2000  immediately  following  establishment  of  the  Project, 
gradually decreased to 47.0% in 2003. Conflict resolution also remained low; 
non-payers or those misusing the ISF were not sanctioned and continued 
to enjoy the benefits of water delivery. Moreover, water distribution 
between the head and tail portions remained inequitable even after the 
introduction of a paid water tender to monitor canals and paid labor to 
clean the canals. Thus, there was a still water shortage in the LB tail 
portion and the main canal (former Section B) . IA members located in the 
tail portion of Barangay Z and Barangay P remained uncooperative, and 
the water shortage and political disputes in Barangay Z being reflected 
in the management of the IA. As a result of dissatisfaction with the IA 
management, the secretary from former Section B and another political 
group in Barangay Z resigned. Thus, despite the efforts of the Project, the 
overall organizational performance of IAB remained unsatisfactory in 2003.
IV.　EVALUATION OF IAB ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE IN FEBRUARY 1999
　The next section discusses the organizational performance of IAB using 
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the models of Freeman and Ostrom.
1)　Source of leadership and leadership responsibility of IAB
　As mentioned above, Freeman points out that the leaders of the 
WUA should be irrigators representing the various reaches of the local 
organization. In AIS, local leaders usually became IA presidents and 
members of the BOD. Most BOD members in the four IAs were also 
active members of formal and informal organizations within each barangay 
such as the farmers’ association, Parents-Teachers Association, Catholic 
Church organizations, and mutual assistance groups for funerals, fund 
raising, and communal works. They participated eagerly in barangay 
activities including barangay meetings, communal work activities, and 
fiestas (festivals). BOD members served concurrently as barangay 
executive board such as barangay captain (village chief) or barangay official 
(assembly member).
　Freeman’s model stipulated a ‘local leader’ who can serve and even unite 
beneficiary farmers and other stakeholders. However, a local leader serving 
only ‘his area’s members could create conflicts and factionalism in the IA 
as happened in IAB. Mr. II (an assumed name) had been the IA presidents 
since 1993. He came from Section B2, the upstream portion, in Barangay Z. 
As a local political and social leader, he had served as barangay official and 
concurrently handled many positions in barangay activities. His area, called 
‘II Area’ (an assumed name) in Barangay Z, covered Section B1 and B2; 
he had many siblings and relatives in these sections. He approached the 
IA members in Sections B1 and B2 through patron-client relationships. He 
was observed to work eagerly for his followers in B2. While he was able to 
enjoin the members’ cooperation in IA activities in ‘II Area’, he was unable 
−142−
to have much involvement in the water shortage problem (because of the 
lack of farm ditches) of the members located in the main canal area in 
Barangay P, who were residents of the different village from IA president. 
Moreover, because of the political conflicts in Barangay Z, Mr. II could not 
control well the members in Section B. Hence, the downstream portion 
of Lateral B in Section B often suffered water shortage, which reinforced 
conflicts. 
　Concentrated attention of the long-term IA president to members in 
‘his area’ (upstream), differential response to the problems of IA members 
in two barangays (i.e. Barangay Z and Barangay P), and political conflicts 
in Barangay Z all served to reinforce the inequitable water distribution 
between the head and tail portions of IAB. While there were cooperative 
members at Sections B1 and B2, members at Section B (LB and main canal) 
gradually became uncooperative. Mr. II’s management approach seemed 
to reinforce conflicts and factionalism among members in Barangay Z, and 
later led to the resignation of the IA’s secretary in Section B. 
2)　Staff responsibility of IAB
　Freeman notes that leadership and staff of the WUA are responsible not 
to the central government but to local members. In order to encourage 
leaders and staff to serve their local members, it is effective to set the 
rules of the WUA so that they are not appointed by the irrigation agency 
but selected by a general election held in the WUA. Moreover, they should 
also be paid not by the government but by the local members themselves. 
In line with this, the PIM of the NIA encourages each IA to follow these 
rules (NIA Central Office 2002). The composition and rules of the BOD 
of IAB seem to fit this model. However, among the nine BOD members 
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and five IA officials (IA president, vice-president, auditor, treasurer, and 
secretary) in February 1999, there were five brothers and relatives of the 
IA president, Mr. II, which showed his strong influence in IA management 
(see Table IV). Mr. II asked his two brothers in B1 to run for BOD during 
the election.
 
　It was observed that while the BOD members were local people, they 
seemed to be responsible more to farmers in their own area rather than to 
the IA as a whole.
3)　Distributional share system of IAB
　As Freeman points out, for an effective WUA, it is indispensable that 
each farmer in the WUA be treated fairly and that the sense of fairness 
Table IV.　BOD of IAB in February 1999
No Position Assumed name Section Canal Barangay Note
1 Auditor NN B1 LB1 Z II brother
2 Vice president MM B1 LB1 Z II brother
3 BOD - B1 LB1 Z
4 BOD - B1 LB1 Z
5 President II B2 LB2 Z 1993~IAP, Barangay Z Official
6 BOD OO B2 LB2 Z II cousin
7 BOD PP B2 LB2 Z II cousin
8 BOD - B2 LB2 Z
9 Treasurer SS B LB, Main canal P Aunt of Barangay P Captain
10 BOD VV B LB, Main canal P 1992~ BOD
11 Secretary QQ B LB Z north Another political group in Barangay Z
12 BOD - B LB Z north
13 BOD RR B LB Z north
14 BOD UU B LB P II cousin
Source: Author’s survey, 1999.
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be shared among WUA members so that no member feels cheated by 
other members or by WUA. Therefore, the water share distributional 
system is the core of any effective WUA. This means that water delivery 
is dependent on the fulfillment of organizational obligations. Also, the water 
share system should remove the head and tail distinction in the service 
queue. A member’s ‘Share of Cost’ for system management is proportionate 
to his/her ‘Share of Water’ and ‘Share of Vote’ in the management of 
the WUA. However, in IAB, water distribution was inequitable. In each 
lateral canal (LB1, LB2, LB), water allocation was rotated among the 
upper, middle, and tail portions every two days. There was enough water 
at LB1 and LB2 (Section B1 and B2), but there was water shortage at 
LB downstream (Section B) because of water loss at the earth canal and 
illegal checking. Also, there was water shortage downstream the main 
canal (Section B) because of the absence of farm ditches. Since one of the 
landowners had refused to give right-of-way to her farmland to NIA (this 
should be donated free of charge) but requested the latter to develop it 
instead, the NIA could not build new farm ditches. The IA members at 
Barangay P had complained about this matter to the BOD and to the NIA, 
but the problems had not been solved.
　Moreover, since turnouts at canals and farm ditches were shared by 
several farmers, they often had water conflicts. To avoid conflict, one 
IA member requested NIA at an IA General Assembly to construct his 
individual turnout, but the NIA rejected the petition because ‘there were 
already many turnouts’. The NIA also suggested that IAB should solve this 
problem by itself.
　A total of 14 BOD members were distributed among the sections as 
follows: B1 (n=4), B2 (n=4), B (n=4), and the main canal (n=2). Although this 
−145−
distribution seems equitable, there was actually disparity when the share 
of BOD members per irrigated area was compared (i.e., the Share of Vote). 
Table V shows that Section B1 had more BOD members while Section B 
(LB and main canal) had fewer BOD members relative to their respective 
share of area. 
　The unfair distribution of BOD members in Section B1 compared to 
Section B seems to be one of the reasons for the inequitable distribution of 
water downstream in B and the lack of a solution.
　Overall, IAB received more water than its area’s share in the AIS 
because of the advantaged position of the upstream areas. Sections B1 and 
B2 located upstream had no water shortage, while downstream of Section 
B suffered from water shortage and conflicts such as illegal checking, 
absence of farm ditches, and so forth. In BOD meetings, the IA president 
and other BOD members from upstream had a greater voice. Hence, 
the problems at B were not solved. The disparity at the head and tail of 
the service queue remained and gradually increased the tail members’ 
discontent with and mistrust of the IA. 
Table V.　Share of BOD per irrigated area in IAB
Canal Irrigated area (ha)
Share of 
irrigated 
area (%)
Share of number 
of BOD per 
irrigated area
Actual number 
of BOD per 
canal (%)
Actual share of 
water allocation 
per canal
B1 24.0 16.0 2.2 4(28.6) 16.6
B2 41.9 28.1 3.9 4(28.6) 29.2
B 67.0 44.9 6.3 4(28.6) 53.5
Main 
Canal 16.4 11.0 1.6 2(14.2) 0.7
Total 149.3 100 14 14(100) 100
Source: Author’s survey and Sugimoto, 2001
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　On the other hand, the first obligation of IA members was ISF payment. 
However, there was also no linkage between water delivery and ISF 
payment. The ISF rate was fixed nationwide by NIA as 3.5 cavans (175 kg) 
paddy per hectare or the equivalent cash. This proved to be an inequitable 
system for IA members located downstream who experienced water 
shortage. Moreover, some members refused to pay the ISF to the BOD 
(who visited each member’s house to collect fees) claiming lack of water 
delivery to their farms. Some farmers with water shortage paid partially 
based on their harvest. However, even some members at Section B2 who 
were known to have had enough water paid only partially. Without a 
measurement system for the volume of water that each member received, 
it was impossible to check whether s/he actually experienced water 
shortage. Again, the penalty of PhP750 for non-payment of ISF was not 
collected. Hence, even if a member paid or did not pay the ISF, there was 
no difference in the water delivery service. It is no wonder then that the 
ISF collection rate had remained low at 48.7% in 2000.
　Voluntary cleaning of canals, another organizational obligation of IA 
members, was not followed. At the upstream portion Section B1 and B2 of 
IAB, there were few absent members at canal cleaning, so penalty fines 
of PhP50 did not need to be collected. Disappointed by the water shortage 
downstream (Section B), only a few members participated in cleaning the 
canals and the absent members refused to pay penalty fines. 
　In summary, the distributional share system was not attained as 
reflected in the head and tail disparity in the service queue (e.g., water 
shortage downstream). Also, the water delivery was not dependent on 
fulfillment of organizational obligations (ISF payment, canal cleaning). Some 
IA members who failed to fulfill their obligations still received water, while 
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the other good members could not receive enough water. In IAB, ‘Share 
of Cost’ for system management was proportionate neither to a member’s 
‘Share of Water’ nor to his/her ‘Share of Vote’.
4)　Water control ability of IAB
　As mentioned above, Freeman states that of the six essential 
characteristics of an effective local WUA, if the first four attributes, 
namely, 1) local leadership, 2) leadership responsibility to local members, 
3) and 4) existence of water share distributional systems, are fulfilled, 
then the remaining two attributes will be realized: 5) water control ability 
of the WUA will increase, and 6) the propensity of members to support 
local organizations will increase. That is, the last two are outcomes of the 
first four. On the other hand, if the irrigation system lacks a water share 
distributional system, upstream farmers have no incentive to invest in 
activities aimed at improving the condition of canals in the downstream 
portion. This results in inequitable water distribution between upstream 
and downstream farmers, as well as lowering the water control ability 
of the WUA and the propensity of downstream members to support the 
WUA.
　IAB has low water control ability. The main canal water delivery was 
not managed by the IA itself but by the NIA gatekeeper, and in a rigid 
manner. If the association needed additional water supply, its IA president 
or BOD first had to request this to the NIA through the IDO. If the IDO 
was absent, the association could not get water from the gatekeeper. 
Because of the IDO and IA members’ confrontational relationship during 
the El Niño in 1998, the IA president rarely contacted the IDO. This 
situation affected the members in Section B, located downstream of LB and 
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the main canal, who suffered from water shortage. The inability of the NIA 
to help solve their problems voiced during the General Assembly increased 
their dissatisfaction toward IAB and the NIA.
　Moreover, irrigated areas and beneficiaries as well as developed paddies 
increased from land development and NIA’s extension of the canals. 
These increases would serve to decrease the volume of total water supply 
because of the dam’s limited capacity. However, there was no negotiation 
system between the NIA and IAs to resolve these matters. 
5)　Members’ support to IAB
　As mentioned above, since Freeman’s four main attributes were not 
fulfilled in IAB, the water control ability of IAB was low, and so was the 
support from members in the downstream portion of IAB. That is, since 
IAB lacked the water share distributional system, namely attributes (3) 
and (4) detailed above, the WUA was unable to attain equity among its 
members, giving the upstream farmers an advantage. This, in turn, created 
discontent among downstream farmers, resulting in withdrawal from 
IA activities. Although there was sufficient water, the IA president and 
BOD members were unable to equalize the higher distribution of water 
upstream compared to downstream. Hence, more members at Sections B1 
and B2 (upstream) volunteered in cleaning the canals, supported the IA, 
and attended the General Assembly. In contrast, fewer members at Section 
B (LB and main canal) downstream volunteered in canal cleaning and 
supported the IA. As discussed earlier, the existence of three social groups 
reinforced the water supply gap between the head and tail portions of the 
area, as well as developed more cooperative members in Section B1 and B2 
compared to members in Section B.
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　To sum up, the organizational performance of IAB did not include the 
success principles of Freeman’s model. Hereafter, Ostrom’s model is used 
to assess IAB’s organizational performance (see Table I).
6)　Clearly defined boundaries of IAB
　Ostrom states that individuals or households who have the right 
to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as 
must the boundaries of the CPR itself (see Table I). Freeman defines 
“organizational boundaries in terms of water share ownership” (Freeman, 
2009). If a share distribution system is to be viable in a WUA, water 
delivery to each member should be dependent on the member’s fulfillment 
of organizational obligations. Therefore, the WUA must clearly define its 
members, that is, those entitled to receive their water, and in exchange, 
required to fulfill organizational obligations such as paying the ISF. The 
WUA must clearly determine the volume of water that each member has 
right to receive and the amount of the cost that he/she must pay. 
　However, the boundaries of local organizations as well as the 
membership of IAB were not clearly defined. The IA could not restrict the 
entry of new beneficiaries, which increased with new land development 
and canal extension. Moreover, registration of IA members was not 
completed. The by-laws of IAB oblige all landowner farmers and tenant 
farmers who are beneficiaries of AIS to become members. Although there 
were 242 actual beneficiaries in 2000, only 152 (62.8%) became members in 
2001 (Sugimoto, 2001). 
　Inasmuch as only the IDO kept a copy of the list of official members, 
even the IA president and BOD members did not know who the actual 
members of the IA were. Hence, the BOD members could not and did 
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not deal with the problem of some non-members enjoying the benefits of 
beneficiaries in their sections. Non-payers or non-members received free 
water even if they did not pay the ISF or cleaned the canals.
　Thus, since IAB lacked a water share distributional system, the 
membership of the WUA remained unclear. Not only the IA president and 
BOD members but also NIA IDO seemed not to have strong incentive to 
clarify the membership, thereby allowing free-riders to take advantage. 
Moreover, “canal extensions were made without sufficient regard to 
accountability for extended command area facilities. So, boundaries are 
broken [geographically] also” (Freeman, 2009). This may result in further 
problems of water shortage in IAB in the future.
7)　Collective-choice arrangement in IAB
　In a third design principle, Ostrom points out that most individuals 
affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying these rules 
(see Table I). Freeman points out that “at the level of the local commands, 
the collective choice arrangements are - in the conceptual models - mostly 
about administering the three-sided share system” (Freeman 2009). Most 
WUA members can participate in modifying share system rules; that is, 
the rules of receipt of benefits (i.e., water distribution), member obligations 
such as ISF payment, and the member’s voting privileges. In IAB, the 
collective-choice arrangement, embodied in the by-laws of IAB when it was 
organized in 1992, had limited authority and ‘power’ of involving members. 
The General Assembly, supposedly the highest decision-making body of the 
IA as stipulated in the by-laws, can approve the IA’s annual budget, amend 
its by-laws, and elect and dismiss BOD members. However, the assembly 
was constrained in modifying the most important operational rules for 
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management. For instance, it could not decide on water distribution 
(volume and timing of water delivery) from the main canal because 
this was handled by the NIA gatekeeper. IAB’s request to the NIA for 
equipment to repair the canals was not always responded to because the 
agency also lacked the resources. Further, the NIA fixed the ISF rate 
nationwide and this could not be changed by IAB.
　The General Assembly, held every two months, is attended by the IDO 
and the Agricultural Technician (AT) of the Department of Agriculture 
(DA). However, in IAB only approximately 60% of members, mostly from 
Sections B1 and B2, attended. The penalty of PhP50 for non-attendance 
was not collected. Since there was no functioning water share distributional 
system in IAB, the members did not intend to amend by-laws on the ISF 
rate or the volume of water that each member received. Moreover, the 
NIA did not consider that the IA members themselves should decide these 
rules. As a result, the NIA decided these rules, letting the IAs follow their 
regulations in a top-down manner.
8)　Monitoring in IAB
　Ostrom states that monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions 
and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or 
be themselves the appropriators (see Table I). If clear share system 
arrangements exist, the WUA should be able to monitor the following: 
whether water is being properly delivered to each member as planned, 
whether members have paid the ISF and fulfilled their obligations to the 
WUA, and lastly, whether collectors have remitted ISF to the WUA.
　In IAB, monitoring activities vital for proper management of the IAs 
were poor in the above aspects. Water delivery was rotated every two 
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days among members located at the upper, middle, and tail portions of 
each lateral canal (B1, B2, and B). The BOD members volunteered to 
monitor the canals and open and close the turnouts so as to meet the 
rotation schedule, which was quite a challenging task,３ especially in LB. 
However, they could not control illegal checking downstream of LB, partly 
because there were only a few BOD members there compared to LB1 
(see Table VI). According to the length of the canal, LB should have had 
17 BOD members, or 11 according to the number of turnouts. However, 
only four members were in charge of monitoring the canal at LB４. Again, 
the BOD members in Section B1 (upstream) had the advantage over their 
counterparts in Section B (downstream) in monitoring canals.
　Freeman points out that the reason “why member-officers [should] take 
minutes, monitor the treasury on behalf of all local command members, 
etc. All these official functions only make sense if there is a viable share 
system to be implemented day by day, week by week, month by month. …
It is the daily administration of a viable share system that is the heart of 
the organization. Without workable organizational shares, the offices are 
meaningless, and the organization deteriorates and the central bureaucracy 
Table VI.　Canal monitoring and the number of BODs in IAB
Canal
Length 
(km)
Number of 
turnout
Appropriate number of 
BOD members per length
Appropriate number of 
BOD members per turnout
Actual number of 
BOD members
LB1 0.76 12 4 4 4
LB2 2.16 22 11 7 4
LB 3.2 33 17 11 4
Source: Author’s survey and Sugimoto, 2001
３　A BOD member received 10% of the ISF collection as an honorarium if he served as a 
collector.
４　In IA B, the secretary and treasurer did not conduct canal monitoring.
────────────
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either withdraws or intervenes and becomes embroiled in impossible local 
squabbles” (Freeman, 2009).In IAB, there was a lack of minutes of meetings 
of the BOD Meeting and the General Assembly, and moreover, the 
treasurer, auditor, and secretary existed in name only. In the NIA’s PIM, 
these documents should have been prioritized by the IDO. 
　Financial management was questionable and monitoring of ISF payment 
was poor. Since official membership of the IA was unclear (because of the 
lack of a list or it being kept by the IDO), most of the BOD members, who 
were also ISF collectors, just took payment from farmers whom they knew 
to be beneficiaries. They submitted the cash to the treasurer without the 
copies of each member’s receipt and the list of payers. Hence, the treasurer 
did not really know the amount of ISF paid by each member. Overall, IAB 
had no proper financial record of the IA’s expenditure and ISF collection. 
Also, there was no financial report or audit on ISF collection presented 
during the BOD Meeting and the General Assembly. The BOD members 
were aware of ISF free-riders but did not deal with the issue.
　Monitoring of ISF collectors was also insufficient. Some collectors sold 
the paddy equivalent payment to the local market then gave the cash 
to the treasurer without the receipt of the paddy sale. As a result, there 
was no system in place to check whether the collectors (including BOD 
members) ever misused the money. Thus, due to the lack of a clear water 
share distributional system, IAB officers did not feel the need to check 
water delivery or fulfilment of organizational obligation. Overall, unclear 
recording and an improper ISF collection system made accountability hard 
to establish. Likewise, poor monitoring activities overlooked free-riders who 
enjoyed the benefits of official membership without obligations.
−154−
9)　Graduated sanctions in IAB 
　Ostrom states that appropriators who violate operational rules are likely 
to be assessed graduated sanctions by other appropriators, by officials 
accountable to these appropriators, or by both (see Table I). While the by-
laws of IAB stipulate penalties against illegal checking, ISF non-payment, 
carabao wallowing, non-IA beneficiaries, non-cleaning of canals, and absence 
at General Meetings, no such penalties were collected. Furthermore, there 
was no sanction for non-payment of ISF, and non-IA beneficiaries and ISF 
misuse were overlooked. As mentioned earlier, these conditions resulted 
in many free-riders in the IA. Again, because of the lack of a functioning 
water share distributional system, there was no strong incentive for the 
BOD of IAB to prevent free-riders. Implementing sanctions was therefore 
often deemed troublesome, tiresome, and sometimes risky, potentially 
harming previously harmonious relationships among neighbors in the 
community. 
10)　Conflict resolution mechanism in IAB
　Ostrom points out that appropriators and officials have rapid access to 
low-cost local arenas for resolution of conflicts among appropriators or 
between appropriators and officials (see Table I). The conflict resolution 
mechanism in IAB needed improvement. BOD Meetings held once every 
two months were expected to be the venue for conflict resolution. The 
BOD member attendance rate was high at 90 to 100% despite the lack of 
an honorarium. While the IA president (Mr. II) commented that “there is 
no management problem in IAB,” the really cooperative members were 
those living in his own area (B2) and B1.
　However, as discussed earlier, the BOD Meetings had been unable to 
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resolve many conflicts, such as the head and tail disparity in the service 
queue, the water shortage at the downstream portion, the free-riders who 
enjoyed the benefits of beneficiary members, the illegal checking of the 
main canal, and the acquisition of right-of-way for new farm ditches from 
the main canal. Some IA members, distrusting the association’s ability for 
conflict resolution, petitioned directly the NIA’s IDO during the General 
Assembly, not through the BOD Meeting. However, these petitions were 
mostly rejected by IDO. Hence, there was growing discontent and mistrust 
toward the IA and the NIA among members.
11)　Minimal recognition of rights to organize within IAB
　Ostrom states that the rights of appropriators to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities (see 
Table I). In PIM, the IA should handle problems by itself while the NIA 
can provide indirect support and monitoring. In essence, the association 
should be fully independent from the NIA’s control as provided by its by-
laws even if it may have been organized initially by the NIA. However, the 
NIA had to intervene in management or conflict issues, sometimes using 
the top-down approach, because of the ‘weak ability’ of the association. 
For instance, the IDO conducted the BOD Meeting and the IA General 
Assembly. Such dependence on the IDO undermined the members’ abilities 
to resolve conflicts among themselves as part of an association with its 
own rules and regulations.
12)　Nested enterprises
　Ostrom states that for CPRs that are part of a larger system, 
appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
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governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises 
(see Table I). IAB had limited structure and functions for nested 
enterprises. Under IAB, Sections B1, B2, B served as the units for water 
rotation, canal monitoring, ISF collection, and canal cleaning. However, the 
section meeting was only started at Section B1. The sections did not have 
enough conflict resolution and governance functions. Above IAB, there 
was no federation of the four IAs or liaison meetings between the NIA and 
the IAs. It was therefore difficult to properly coordinate among the IAs, 
or between the NIA and IAs, on water delivery and so forth. In summary, 
based on Freeman and Ostrom’s models, the organizational performance 
(Table VII) of IAB hardly met the ideals of PIM. 
Table VII.　Evaluation of IAB organizational performance in February 1999
Indicator Evaluation
Source of leadership Yes (Local)
Responsibility of leader and staff Weak (Local, but especially IA President’s Section)
Share system of water delivery and 
obligation
No
Head and tail distinction No
Water resources control ability No
Member supports
Weak (Support from Section B1, B2, but less 
support from Section B)
Clearly defined boundaries No
Collective choice arrangement Weak
Monitoring No
Graduated sanctions No
Conflict resolution mechanisms No
Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize
Weak
Nested enterprises Weak
Overall performance Poor
Source: Author’s survey, 1999.
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V.　CONCLUSION
　The poor performance of IAB as a WUA in 1999 “exhibits problems that 
are found in all too many irrigation systems in many countries” (Freeman, 
1992:10) as well as in IAs across the Philippines. Why did PIM at IAB show 
signs of failure? Three reasons are proposed: first, manpower and funds 
were inadequate; second, the PIM process was not properly implemented; 
and third, the design principles of PIM had some defects. As mentioned 
above, in order to deal with the inadequate manpower and funds and 
Table VIII.　Evaluation of IAB organizational performance in August 2003
Indicator Evaluation in February 
1999
Evaluation in August 2003
Source of Leadership Yes (Local) Yes (Local)
Responsibility of leader 
and staff
Weak (Local, but especially 
IA President’s Section)
Weak (Local, but especially IA President’s Section)
Share system of water 
delivery and obligation
No No (No linkage with water allocation and ISF payment; 
low ISF collection rate)
Head and tail 
distinction
No Weak (Hire water tender, employ paid labor for Canal 
Cleaning; but water shortage at downstream of LB)
Water resources 
control ability
No Weak (Liaison meeting between NIA and 4 IAs; but 
water loss at Lateral canal)
Members support Weak (Support from Section 
B1, B2, but less support 
from Section B)
Weak (Support from Section B1, B2, but less support 
from Section B; resignation of Secretary from Section B)
Clearly defined 
boundaries
No Weak (Establishment of Farmer Irrigators Group (FIG), 
FIG map, IA membership registration; but existence of 
non-IA member beneficiaries)
Collective choice 
arrangement
Weak Weak (BOD consists of FIG Chair, active and regular 
IA General Assembly; but limited ability to modify 
important operational rules)
Monitoring No Weak (Improvement of ISF collection system and 
recording; but not revealing information on misconducts)
Graduated sanctions No No (Non-collection of penalty, overlooked collectors’ 
misuse and ISF nonpayment)
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms
No Weak (Discussion of problems at BOD Meetings, 
increased negotiation ability with NIA; but overlooked 
misconduct of BOD members)
Minimal recognition of 
rights to organize
Weak Yes (Improvement of relationship with NIA, increase 
of IA funds, construction of IA Office, purchase of IA 
equipment)
Nested enterprise Weak Weak (Establishment of FIG, FIG meeting, liaison 
meeting with NIA and IA; but inactive FIG Meeting)
Overall performance Poor Weak
Source: Author’s survey
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the improper PIM process, the Japanese government implemented the 
Project from July 1999 to November 2003. However, overall organizational 
performance remained unsatisfactory in August 2003 (Table VIII). 
　Why did PIM at IAB show signs of failure even after the Project? Now I 
would like to propose that it was for the third reason: the design principles 
of PIM had some defects. The observed problems are plausibly an outcome 
of deficient organizational design; that is, the PIM design principles did 
not include the distributional share system, which Freeman set at the 
very heart of an effective WUA. The ISF was set as a fixed rate per farm 
size and was not linked with the volume of irrigation water each farmer 
received. Since the head and tail distinction remained in the service queue, 
farmers in the tail portion were disadvantaged by water shortage. 
　Moreover, water delivery was not dependent on the members’ fulfillment 
of their obligations to the organization. Some IA members in upstream 
areas who did not pay the ISF continued to receive water, while members 
downstream who met their obligations did not receive sufficient water. 
Thus, regardless of whether the ISF was paid, there were no differences in 
the water delivery service. It is therefore no wonder that the ISF collection 
rate remained low. Since IA members shared common turnouts, the IA 
management could not apply the most effective sanction (i.e., stopping 
water delivery) in the case of non-payers and non-members, or toward 
BOD members who misused funds. As a result, free-riders who broke rules 
and continued to receive water could not be avoided, and misconduct by 
BOD members could not be stopped. 
　The gap between the upstream and downstream farmers was perceived 
to be reinforced by the election of an IA president who always came from 
upstream. Freeman points out that “the authority variable reflects where 
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they look for definition of success and failure as job-holders” (Freeman 
2009). If there is a viable share system, the performance of IA presidents 
and BOD members could be evaluated by whether an equitable water 
supply is provided to all beneficiaries registered as IA members, regardless 
of whether their farms are in head or tail portion, thereby creating a sense 
of fairness among IA members. However, since there was no viable share 
distributional system in IAB, the total amount of ISF to be paid remained 
the same regardless of water shortages in the tail portion. Therefore, it 
seems that the IA president did not have a particularly strong incentive 
to solve the head and tail distinction in order to provide an equitable 
water supply to all IA members. It is not surprising that instead, he 
seemed concerned more with pleasing ‘his people’ in the neighboring 
area and gaining support from neighboring IA members. This is why IA 
management in IAB was unsuccessful even though there was enough 
water. 
　However, it was also difficult to introduce the distributional share system 
outlined by Freeman (1992) to IAB. First, the IA management could not 
decide by itself to introduce ISF that was levied by water volume and 
not by farm size, because this was decided on by the NIA Central Office 
throughout the Philippines. Second, the facilities of the AIS were not 
suitable for measuring the volume of water delivered to individual farms. 
Many beneficiary farmers share common turnouts and the numbers 
of farm ditches were not enough. So, many farmers received water 
from paddy-to-paddy irrigation. Also, there was no water gauge or the 
equivalent equipment to measure the water volume for individual farms. 
Third, IAB could not apply the most effective sanction (i.e., stopping the 
water supply) to the violating members because of the common turnouts. 
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Cutting water supply at one turnout would affect other good members. 
Fourth, because of the JSM, the IA management could not fully control 
the volume and timing of water delivery as needed by the members; the 
NIA managed the dam and main canal. Thus, IAB did not have high water 
resource control ability. 
　To conclude, the lack of a distributional share system in the design 
principles of the NIA’s PIM is thought to have led to the unsuccessful 
management of IAB. However, introducing a share system in IA 
management proved difficult due to institutional problems alongside 
technical problems regarding the physical structure of the irrigation 
system. 
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List of Abbreviation
AIS Irrigation System A
AT Agricultural Technician
BOD Board of Directors
CIS Communal Irrigation Systems
CPR Common-pool resources
DA Department of Agriculture
FIG Farmers Irrigation Group
IA Irrigators' Association
IAB Irrigators' Association B
IDO Institutional Develoment Officer
IMT Irrigation Management Transfer
ISF Irrigation Service Fee
JSM Joint System Management
LB Lateral Canal B
LB1 Lateral Canal B1
LB2 Lateral Canal B2
LC Lateral Canal C
LD Lateral Canal D
NIA National Irrigation Administration
NIS National Irrigation Systems
PIM Participatory Irrigation Management
PIO Provincial Irrigation Office
RRA Rapid Rural Appraisal
SSI Semi-Structured Interview
WUA Water Users Association
